

























Editor: Prof. Regina T. Riphahn, Ph.D.   
Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg 
© Hartmut Egger, Michael Koch 
 Labor Unions and the Scale and Scope of Multi-Product Firms∗
Hartmut Egger†
University of Bayreuth





This paper sets up a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with multi-product ﬁrms and
union wage setting in a subset of industries. By claiming a wage premium, labor unions enforce a
decline in ﬁrm scale and scope and thus dampen industrial output, with negative feedback eﬀects
on the competitive wage and positive ones on ﬁrm scale and scope in non-unionized sectors. In
this setting, a decline in union density raises labor demand and thus wages in non-unionized
as well as unionized industries. This induces a general decline in ﬁrm scale and scope, with the
respective reduction being more pronounced in non-unionized industries. Aside from analyzing
the consequences of deunionization in a closed economy, we also shed light on how multi-product
ﬁrms respond to a country’s movement from autarky to free trade with a symmetric partner
country. Access to international trade stimulates labor demand and raises the competitive as
well as the union wage, thereby lowering ﬁrm scope in all industries. Since the labor market
distortion becomes less severe, unionized and non-unionized ﬁrms become more similar in the
size of their product range. While scope eﬀects are unambiguous, adjustments in ﬁrm scale turn
out to be less clearcut and inter alia depend on the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
JEL codes: F12, F16, J51, L13
Keywords: Multi-product ﬁrms, General oligopolistic equilibrium, Labor unions, International
trade
∗We are grateful to Carsten Eckel and participants at the 12th G¨ ottingen Workshop on International Economics,
the European Trade Study Group, the 4th FIW Research Conference on International Economics and the 9th and
10th BGPE Research Workshop as well as seminar participants at the University of Bayreuth for helpful comments
and suggestions.
†Corresponding author: University of Bayreuth, Department of Law and Economics, Universit¨ atsstr. 30, 95447
Bayreuth, Germany; e-mail: hartmut.egger@uni-bayreuth.de; phone: +49.921.55-2906; fax: +49.921.55-5845.
11 Introduction
Empirical studies highlight the omnipresence of multi-product ﬁrms (MPFs). For instance, Bernard,
Redding, and Schott (2010) document their dominant role in US manufacturing industries, while
Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2008) show that the respective ﬁndings are not
a peculiarity of developed countries. In view of these observations it is not surprising that the
determinants and consequences of MPFs have reached the center stage of economic research. In
recent years, attention has been given to the question how MPFs absorb macroeconomic shocks, with
international trade being the main shock of interest. By simultaneously accounting for adjustments
in both ﬁrm scale and scope, this literature has signiﬁcantly improved our knowledge about how
ﬁrms respond to macroeconomic changes. However, being concerned with the product market side
of the economy, existing studies model factor markets in a rudimentary way. In particular, they
assume perfectly competitive labor markets and therefore end up with identical wage payments of
all producers. This assumption seems to be restrictive as it is an empirical fact that ﬁrms pay
diﬀering wages, and wages themselves are a key cost factor and thus an important determinant of
both ﬁrm scale and scope in models of MPFs.
Shedding light on the role of labor market imperfection for ﬁrm scale and scope is the aim of
this paper. For this purpose, we set up a general oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model with
MPFs along the lines of Eckel and Neary (2010) and enrich this framework by introducing a simple
model of union wage setting. In the Eckel and Neary (2010) framework, there is a continuum of
industries and a small (exogenous) number of ﬁrms competing in quantities within each of these
industries. Firms employ labor to produce a range of diﬀerentiated product varieties. They have
a core competence in one of these varieties which they produce at the lowest marginal cost. By
expanding the scope of their product range, ﬁrms start manufacturing varieties with a larger distance
to their core competence and thus higher marginal production costs.1 With respect to modeling
union wage setting, we rely on a similar framework as Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009). In particular,
we assume that labor unions are active in a subset of industries and unilaterally set wages there,
while in the rest of the economy ﬁrms pay the competitive wage.
The asymmetry of sectors with respect to their labor market institutions is a key aspect of our
analysis. It allows us to study the consequences of union wage setting on ﬁrm scale and scope and
it provides novel insights on how labor market imperfections in certain industries feed back on ﬁrm
organization in the rest of the economy. Setting a markup on the competitive wage, labor unions
enforce a reduction in the output and employment level of unionized ﬁrms. While this eﬀect is
1Abstracting from any additional costs of introducing a new variety the model captures the idea of ﬂexible manu-
facturing, which is a widely used concept of representing MPFs (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Eaton and Schmitt,
1994; Norman and Thisse, 1999; Eckel, 2009). While there are many alternative ways of modeling MPFs (see, for in-
stance, Arkolakis and Muendler, 2007; Feenstra and Ma, 2008; Nocke and Yeaple, 2008; Bernard, Redding, and Schott,
2009; Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano, 2010), there are good reasons for relying on the Eckel and Neary (2010) approach
when accounting for union wage setting. With oligopolistic competition between a small number of competitors and
linear demand in each industry, our model is related to a large and well-established literature on unionized oligopoly.
Thus, we can directly compare our results with ﬁndings from this literature in order to highlight whether and how
previous insights on the interplay between labor market and product market imperfections have to be modiﬁed if one
accounts for multi- instead of single-product ﬁrms.
2present in any model of unionized oligopoly, there is an additional adjustment margin in a setting
with MPFs. By raising marginal production costs, unions reduce the incentive of ﬁrms to operate
a wide product range and, hence, they also lower ﬁrm scope. Furthermore, union wage setting
lowers aggregate employment ceteris paribus and thus induces an adjustment in the competitive
wage, which must fall in order to clear the labor market in a general equilibrium environment. This
decline in the competitive wage raises ﬁrm scale and scope in non-unionized industries.
With these insights on the basic mechanics of the model at hand, we can apply our theoretical
vehicle to analyze in more detail how previous insights from the literature need to be modiﬁed if
one takes into account union wage setting in the presence of MPFs. To highlight the relevance
of our model, we focus on two speciﬁc research questions that have sparked considerable interest
in academic circles and, at the same time, are relevant for policy makers who aim at introducing
measures of deregulation in product and/or labor markets. The ﬁrst question we are interested
in is how ﬁrms absorb changes in labor market institutions. From an empirical point of view,
the probably most notable change in labor market institutions is the signiﬁcant decline in union
coverage. This deunionization process is a worldwide phenomenon which has been observed in all
industrialized economies over the last four decades – although, of course, to a diﬀerent extent. For
instance, as documented by OECD (2004), in the US union density fell from 27% to 13% over the
period 1970 to 2000, while in Germany the decline of union density was much less pronounced: it
fell from 32% to 25% over the same period.
From Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) we know that in an otherwise similar framework with
single product ﬁrms (SPFs), deunionization raises the competitive as well as the union wage and
thus lowers scale of both unionized and non-unionized ﬁrms. Since the union wage increases less
than proportionally, deunionization lowers the scale diﬀerential between the two types of producers.
In this paper, we show that ﬁrm-level adjustments become more sophisticated if ﬁrms produce more
than just a single variety and that the endogeneity of the product range leads to further interesting
results upon how ﬁrms respond to changes in labor market institutions. To be more speciﬁc,
deunionization induces an increase in the competitive as well as the union wage, similar to the
model with SPFs. However, in a setting with MPFs the associated cost increase renders production
of those varieties that have the largest distance to a ﬁrm’s core competence unattractive, so that
ﬁrms reduce the scope of their product range and thus shrink at the extensive margin. Both the cost
increase and the shortening of the product range induce a decline in total ﬁrm scale, while the output
reduction for a single variety is the stronger, the further away it is from a ﬁrm’s core competence.
Furthermore, by focusing on the production of high-competence, i.e. low-cost, varieties, all ﬁrms
(except for the newly deunionized ones) can produce a higher level of output with a given level of
labor input and thus are more productive on average.2 A further notable diﬀerence between our
setup and the one with SPFs arises with respect to the impact of deunionization on the total number
of product varieties that are available for consumers. While in a model with an exogenous number
2For further discussion on how to measure labor productivity in a setting with MPFs see Eckel and Neary (2010).
For our purpose, relying on the rudimentary measure of (unweighted) output per worker is meaningful, as this measure
allows us to present the main insights from our analysis in the simplest possible way.
3of SPFs the number of available product varieties stays constant by construction, in our framework
with MPFs deunionization also impacts the total number of available varieties, with the sign of the
respective eﬀect depending on the prevailing labor market institutions. To be more speciﬁc, if the
share of unionized sectors shrinks in a country with a low union density, the increase in the number
of varieties produced by newly deunionized MPFs dominates the decline in the number of varieties
produced by all other MPFs and, hence, the total number of varieties increases. The opposite
is true in countries with high union density. Finally, by weakening the labor market distortion
deunionization lowers the union wage premium and thus ﬁrms become more similar in both scale
and scope if union density falls.
In a second application of our model, we investigate how ﬁrm scale and scope are aﬀected if a
country opens up for free trade with a symmetric partner country. As outlined by Brander (1981),
a movement from autarky to trade raises competition in an oligopolistic market and thus provides
a stimulus for the production of all ﬁrms ceteris paribus. In a general equilibrium environment
with factor market clearing, this induces an increase in the competitive wage, which counteracts
the partial equilibrium production stimulus. As outlined by Neary (2009), in a model with SPFs,
symmetric industries, and no labor market distortions, the two eﬀects cancel and thus ﬁrm scale
remains unaﬀected by the trade shock.3 In an otherwise identical model with MPFs, ﬁrms lower
their scope in response to a higher competitive wage, thereby leaving more labor for employment in
activities that are closer to the ﬁrms’ core competences. To put it in the words of Eckel and Neary
(2010) ﬁrms are leaner and meaner in the open economy and they experience a productivity surge
as their total output increases for a given level of labor input. This points to a new channel through
which gains from trade can materialize, one that is speciﬁc to models of MPFs.
By extending the Eckel and Neary (2010) framework to one with labor market imperfections, we
further enrich the picture of possible ﬁrm-level adjustments to globalization. As in textbook models
of unionized oligopoly with SPFs, trade exerts a union-disciplining eﬀect and thus lowers union
wage claims ceteris paribus (Huizinga, 1993; Sørensen, 1993).4 Hence, both scale and scope eﬀects
of trade are more pronounced in unionized industries, so that economic activity shifts towards these
sectors. All other things equal, this lowers production in non-unionized industries and the shift
eﬀect may actually be strong enough to dominate the output stimulus from being more focused
on the production of high-competence varieties. Hence, labor market imperfections render ﬁrm-
level adjustments to international trade more sophisticated and less clearcut than one might have
expected from the analysis in Eckel and Neary (2010).
Aside from looking at pure level eﬀects, we also study the diﬀerential impact that trade exerts
on unionized and non-unionized ﬁrms. In this respect, we show that trade weakens the labor market
distortion and thus lowers the union wage premium. This eﬀect is instrumental for a reduction in
the scope diﬀerential between the two types of producers. Similarly, the decline in the union wage
3In such a featureless economy trade only aﬀects the distribution of economic rents in the society: by raising the
competitive wage, workers gain at cost of ﬁrm owners.
4Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) show that his partial equilibrium argument does not necessarily imply a lower
absolute level of union wages in a general equilibrium environment. In fact, the increase in the competitive wage
counteracts the partial equilibrium impact eﬀect and it may dominate for suﬃciently high levels of union density.
4premium also reduces the domestic output diﬀerential of local producers. However, this eﬀect is
counteracted by a widening of the output gap at the extensive margin as, after a country’s opening
up for trade, ﬁrms start exporting and the respective exports are larger for non-unionized than
for unionized ﬁrms. Which of these two eﬀects dominates is not clearcut in general and depends
on the degree of product diﬀerentiation. Smaller degrees of product diﬀerentiation reinforce the
pro-competitive eﬀect of trade and thus amplify the union-disciplining eﬀect of foreign competition.
This strengthens the negative impact of trade on the domestic production gap between unionized
and non-unionized producers, so that the scale diﬀerential decreases for small degrees of product
diﬀerentiation. On the contrary, for high degrees of product diﬀerentiation it is the output expansion
eﬀect in the export market that dominates so that the ﬁrm scale diﬀerential increases in response
to trade.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the main assump-
tions, describe the basic model structure, and characterize the autarky equilibrium. After a brief
discussion on how union wage setting aﬀects ﬁrm scale and scope, we study how MPFs respond to
a decline in union density. In Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium in an open economy with
free trade between two symmetric countries and compare the outcome in the open economy with
the one in the closed economy in order to shed light on how trade aﬀects union wage setting as well
as ﬁrm scale and scope in the presence of labor market imperfection. Section 4 concludes with a
brief summary of the most important results.
2 MPFs and imperfect labor markets: The closed economy
The country under consideration hosts a continuum of industries, with an oligopolistic market
structure and a small (exogenous) number n of ﬁrms in each of these industries.5 The industries
are identical in all respects except for the prevailing labor market institutions. While ﬁrms in a
subset of industries are exposed to union wage-setting, ﬁrms in the rest of the economy pay the
competitive wage.
2.1 Preferences and consumer demand
There exists a representative consumer, whose preferences are represented by a two-tier quasi-
homothetic utility function. The upper tier is an additive function of a continuum of sub-utilities,
5The assumption of an exogenous ﬁrm number can be motivated by a Ricardo-Viner approach with an exogenous
industry-level capital stock K and a capital input requirement of k for setting up a ﬁrm and providing the relevant
headquarters services. The number of ﬁrms is then determined by n = K/k. By imposing the assumption of an
exogenous ﬁrm number, we restrict our attention to short-run equilibria (see Leahy and Neary, 2010). In the long-
run, ﬁrm owners can shift their capital endowment towards those industries that oﬀer the highest return to their
investment. Even though a detailed analysis of such long-run adjustments is beyond the scope of our analysis, we will
at least brieﬂy discuss how such an extension impacts our results in the conclusions section.





Each sub-utility is a quadratic function of consumption levels q(i,z), i ∈ [1,N(z)], where N(z)
is the measure (or, in the interest of a more accessible interpretation, the number, henceforth) of


















where a, b denote non-negative preference parameters with the usual interpretation and ρ is an
inverse measure of product diﬀerentiation, which is assumed to lie between 0 and 1.6
Aggregate demand in this setting is determined by maximizing utility of the representative





p(i,z)q(i,z)didz ≤ I, (3)












where λ is the representative consumer’s marginal utility of income. As it has become standard in
the literature, we choose the marginal utility of income as the num´ eraire and set λ equal to one. Due
to this normalization all nominal variables are measured relative to the representative consumer’s
marginal utility of income. Since λ is not the price of a consumption good, the respective values
have to be interpreted with care (see Neary, 2009, for further discussion).
From Eq. (4) we can infer insights upon the role of preference parameter ρ in our setting. As
mentioned above, ρ is a measure of product diﬀerentiation and lies in interval [0,1]. If ρ = 1 products
are homogeneous (perfect substitutes), so that the price is linear in total industry consumption:
p(i,z) = a−b
  N(z)
0 q(i,z)di. In the other limiting case with ρ = 0, goods are perfectly diﬀerentiated
in the perception of consumers, so that the price for each variety only depends on consumption of
6The preferences in Eqs. (1) and (2) are the same as in Eckel and Neary (2010). They combine the continuum-
quadratic approach to symmetric horizontal product diﬀerentiation of Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002) with the
preference speciﬁcation in Neary (2009). By formulating the respective preferences of the representative consumer,
we have presumed that the following two conditions are fulﬁlled for any individual consumer: participation in the
market for any good i and non-satiation in the consumption of these goods. Clearly, both of these conditions depend
on endogenous variables. However, under the additional assumption of identical consumer preferences, we know from
previous work that these conditions are fulﬁlled if a lump-sum tax-transfer system redistributes a suﬃcient level of
income from rich to poor agents. Being not interested in income distribution or individual welfare levels per se, we
can thus safely assume that the two conditions are fulﬁlled throughout our analysis.
6this variety but is independent of the consumption of all other varieties in this industry. In the
latter case, indirect demand is given by p(i,z) = a − bq(i,z).
2.2 Technology, production, and proﬁt maximization
As outlined in the introductory section, we associate MPFs with the idea of ﬂexible manufacturing,
and thus assume that ﬁrms can expand their product range “with only a minimum of adaptation”
(Eckel and Neary, 2010, p.192). The costs of adaptation are modeled by higher labor requirements
for producing a unit of output of a ﬁrm’s non-core competence product, and the respective adapta-
tion costs are assumed to be monotonically increasing in the distance between a speciﬁc product to
the ﬁrm’s core competence variety. However, adding a new variety to the product range does not
alter the costs of producing other varieties nor does it involve any ﬁxed costs. To put it formally,
we denote marginal production costs of ﬁrm j = 1,...,n in industry z for producing variety i by
cj(i,z) = γj(i)wj(z), with γj(i) being the constant labor input coeﬃcient for producing variety i
and wj(z) being the wage rate in industry z. We associate ﬁrm j’s core competence with variety
i = 0 and capture ﬂexible manufacturing by assuming ∂cj(i,z)/∂i = ∂γj(i)/∂i × wj(z) > 0. While
the main mechanisms of our analysis do not hinge on a speciﬁc functional form of γj(i), we impose
the additional assumption γj(i) = ei in the interest of analytical tractability.7 Finally, we assume
that product ranges are ﬁrm-speciﬁc, implying that each ﬁrm has its own core competence and
produces its own set of varieties.
Although the technology assumptions considered here are the same as in Eckel and Neary (2010),
there remains an important diﬀerence between the two settings. While Eckel and Neary (2010)
abstract from labor market imperfections and assume that all ﬁrms pay the common competitive
wage rate, we allow for sectoral diﬀerences in labor market institutions and thus end up with
industry-speciﬁc wage rates. Hence, in contrast to Eckel and Neary (2010) marginal production
costs in our model comprise both a product-speciﬁc component, γj(i), and a sector-speciﬁc one,
wj(z).
Considering the technology assumptions above and denoting by δj(z) the scope of the product








where xj(i,z) denotes output of variety i. Considering the market clearing condition xj(i,z) =
qj(i,z) and maximizing j’s proﬁts in (5) with respect to xj(i,z) gives
xj(i,z) =
a − cj(i,z) − bρ(Xj(z) + Y (z))
2b(1 − ρ)
, (6)
7With this additional assumption, the output across the diﬀerent varieties within MPFs is highly skewed in the
distance to a ﬁrm’s core competence. This is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings in Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik,
and Topalova (2008) and Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010).
7with Xj(z) =
  δj(z)
0 xj(i,z)di denoting ﬁrm scale and Y (z) =
  N(z)
0 x(i,z)di being industry-wide
output of all n producers. The negative impact of industry output Y (z) on ﬁrm j’s proﬁt-maximizing
output of variety i captures the fact that under Cournot competition (and linear demand) output
levels are strategic substitutes. Furthermore, the additional negative impact of this ﬁrm’s own total
output Xj(z) reﬂects the cannibalization eﬀect, i.e. under Cournot competition MPFs internalize
that increasing output of a certain variety lowers prices for this as well as all other varieties in the
ﬁrm’s product range. Both of these eﬀects do exist if and only if ρ > 0, i.e. if products are not
perfectly diﬀerentiated (see above).
Furthermore, maximizing proﬁts (5) with respect to δj(z) yields ﬁrm j’s optimal product range
δj(z) = ln
 




Comparing Eqs. (6) and (7), we see that ﬁrms add new varieties to their product portfolio until the
marginal costs of the last variety δj(z) equals the marginal revenue of this variety at zero output.
Using the latter insight in Eq. (6), we can derive a second expression for optimal output of variety
i, by expressing the respective output level of this variety in terms of the diﬀerence between its own
















which, all other things equal, increases in the ﬁrm’s product range δj(z) and, for a given scope,
increases in wage rate wj(z). The latter may be surprising at a ﬁrst glance. However, we know
from above that any ﬁrm produces zero output of its marginal product variety, while an increase
in the wage rate raises the production cost diﬀerential of any two varieties. Hence, keeping ﬁrm
scope constant, an increase in wj(z) unambiguously raises output of all interior varieties, i.e. of all
varieties i < δj(z), with the respective output expansion being the more pronounced, the closer a
variety is to the ﬁrm’s core competence.
2.3 Union wage setting and the labor market
Regarding factor endowments, we assume that the country under consideration is populated by L
workers, each of them supplying one unit of labor. Workers are mobile across sectors, with sectors
8We can write the ﬁrst-order condition for the proﬁt-maximizing output of variety i as dΠj(z)/dxj(i,z) = pj(i,z)−
cj(i,z) − b[(1 − ρ)xj(i,z) + ρXj(z)] = 0, which implies that pj(i,z) − cj(i,z) > 0 ∀i. Furthermore, the ﬁrst-order
condition for optimal ﬁrm scope is given by dΠj(z)/dδj(z) = [pj(i,z) − cj (δj(z),z)]xj (δj(z),z) = 0 which, given our
insights above, implies xj (δj(z),z) = 0. Evaluating (6) at i = δj(z) and subtracting the resulting expression from
xj (i,z), then gives Eq. (6
′).
8diﬀering in the prevailing labor market institutions. To be more speciﬁc, we apply the labor market
model of Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) and assume that a subset of industries is unionized, while
in the rest of the economy, the labor market is perfectly competitive. Without loss of generality,
we order industries such that unions are active in all sectors with z ≤   z. Provided that unions are
only active in a subset of industries, i.e.   z < 1, involuntary unemployment does not materialize in
this setting, as workers who do not ﬁnd a job in unionized industries will move to non-unionized
industries, and the competitive wage will fall until all workers can ﬁnd employment there. With
respect to wage setting in industries z ∈ [0, ˜ z], we consider sector-level unions which unilaterally set
wages that are binding for all workers of the respective industry, while, at the same time, leaving
the right-to-manage employment to ﬁrms. Unions are utilitarian and have an objective function of
the form9 Ω(z) = [w(z) − wc]nl(z), where wc is the economy-wide competitive wage and w(z), l(z)
are union wage claims and ﬁrm-level labor demand in unionized industry z, respectively.
Diﬀerences in the labor market institutions generate asymmetries between unionized and non-
unionized industries. However, there prevails no asymmetry of sectors within these two subgroups
of industries. Due to this feature of our model, we can introduce superscripts u and c to refer to
unionized and non-unionized industries, respectively, and can suppress sector index z from now on.
Then, substituting l(z) =
  δ(z)






Comparing the objective function in (9) with the respective objective function in Bastos and Kre-
ickemeier (2009) provides insights on how the problem for the labor union changes if ﬁrms produce
more than just a single product variety. With MPFs having the right-to-manage employment, they
simultaneously adjust ﬁrm scale and scope to changes in union wage claims, and they do so in a non-
trivial way because of the oligopolistic structure in the product market. It is the adjustment in ﬁrm
scope, which diﬀerentiates our analysis from Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009), and it is this aspect
which is in the center of our interest. However, it is also this additional adjustment margin which
renders a formal characterization of equilibrium and a discussion of comparative-static experiments
diﬃcult. In order to present our main insights in the simplest possible way, we therefore reduce
complexity and consider a benchmark scenario with ρ = 0 in the next subsection. As outlined
above, with ρ = 0 there is no strategic interaction of ﬁrms in the product market and widening the
product range does not cannibalize a ﬁrm’s output in its other varieties. A detailed discussion of
the more sophisticated model variant with ρ > 0 is postponed to Subsection 2.5.
9Since all ﬁrms within a particular industry are symmetric and unions are organized at the industry level, we
suppress ﬁrm indices from now on in order to simplify notation.
92.4 A benchmark model of MPFs with perfectly diﬀerentiated goods
If ρ = 0, ﬁrms behave as monopolists with respect to each of their varieties. In this case, Eqs. (6)



















Maximizing union objective (11) with respect to wu gives the union wage claim as an implicit









where ω ≡ wu/wc denotes the union wage premium. It is easily shown that ω > 1, implying
that ﬁrms in unionized industries are smaller in both scale and scope than their counterparts in
non-unionized industries (see Eq. (10)). However, this result has to be interpreted with care – in
particular, when contrasting it with real-world evidence – because we have focused on labor market
institutions as the only source of asymmetry in our model, thereby abstracting from other reasons
of cross-sectoral diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics, as, for instance, exogenous diﬀerences in labor
productivity or ﬁrm organization.
For a better understanding of how ﬂexible manufacturing aﬀects union wage setting, it is mean-
ingful to compare Eq. (12) to the union wage claim in an otherwise identical model with SPFs.
Imposing the additional assumption that labor productivity in the SPF model is equal to one, as
for the core-competence variety in our setting, we obtain wu = a/2+wc/2 (see Bastos and Kreicke-
meier, 2009). In view of ω > 1, it is thus immediate that union wage claims are lower if ﬁrm scope is
endogenous. MPFs respond to higher union wage claims with a reduction in scale and a shortening
of their product range. However, a shortening of the product range implies that ﬁrms stop manu-
facturing those products with the highest labor input coeﬃcients and, all other things equal, the
employment reduction in response to a higher union wage claim is therefore more pronounced in a
model with ﬂexible manufacturing than in an otherwise identical model with SPFs and exogenous
ﬁrm scope. This renders excessive wage claims less attractive from the perspective of unions.
So far, we have treated the competitive wage, wc, as an exogenous variable and, hence, have
looked at our model from a partial equilibrium perspective. To solve for the general equilibrium
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10with the left-hand side of this equation representing exogenous labor supply and the right-hand side
representing economy-wide labor demand. Even in the parsimonious benchmark model, we cannot
explicitly solve for the equilibrium competitive wage. However, we can show that labor demand is
a negative function of the competitive wage and that Eq. (13) has a unique solution in wc.10
Together, Eqs. (10), (12) and (13) determine ﬁrm size and scope in general equilibrium, and we
can use the respective equations for investigating how ﬁrm-level adjustments respond to a decline
in union density as observed in the industrialized world over the last four decades. In our setting,
we can associate a decline in union density with a fall in the share of unionized industries,   z. Since
non-unionized ﬁrms employ more workers than unionized ones, a fall in   z provides an employment
stimulus in the newly deunionized industries and thus raises economy-wide labor demand. With
labor demand now exceeding labor supply, the competitive wage must increase in order to restore
the labor market equilibrium. According to (12), a higher competitive wage induces higher union
wage claims and, hence, labor costs increase in all industries, except for the newly deunionized
ones. The cost increase prompts ﬁrms to use their labor input more productively, thereby inducing
a shortening of their product range (see (10)). At the same time, ﬁrms reduce the output of each
interior variety, and they do so more than proportionally for varieties that are further away from
their core competence. Hence, all MPFs (except for the newly deunionized ones) end up with
smaller scale and scope, but also operate at a higher labor productivity.
By construction, this productivity increase does not materialize in models with SPFs, provided
that output of a speciﬁc variety is linear in labor input (see Bastos and Kreickemeier, 2009). How-
ever, the productivity stimulus is not the only aspect that diﬀerentiates the MPF model considered
here from an otherwise identical framework with SPFs. By lowering the scope of MPFs in all
industries in which the labor market institution does not change, deunionization ceteris paribus
reduces the total number of varieties that are available to consumers. This eﬀect is counteracted
by an expansion in the product range of newly deunionized ﬁrms, and the relative strength of the
two eﬀects depends crucially on the degree of labor market imperfection. To be more speciﬁc, we
ﬁnd that the latter (former) eﬀect dominates, so that the total number of product varieties goes
up (down) in response to deunionization, if the share of unionized sectors has been small (large)
prior to the fall in union density (see the appendix). This is intuitive, as the negative scope eﬀect
of a given wage increase is less pronounced ceteris paribus for high initial wage levels, while wages
wu,wc are the higher, the smaller is ˜ z prior to the deunionization process. Such adjustments in the
number of available product varieties, which may be an important channel through which welfare
eﬀects of deunionization materialize, are absent in models of SPFs, at least as long as the number
of competitors is held constant.
Aside from studying pure level eﬀects, we can also shed light on the diﬀerential impact a decline
10Substituting e





and diﬀerentiating the resulting expression with respect
to w(z), gives df(z)/dw(z) < 0. In view of dw
u/dw
c > 0, this proves that the right-hand side of (13) is decreasing
in w
c. Furthermore, noting from Eq. (12) that w
u = 0 if w
c = 0 and w
u = a if w
c = a, it is immediate that the
right-hand side of (13) approaches inﬁnity if w
c → 0, while it falls to zero if w
c → a. Putting together, this proves
existence and uniqueness of the labor market equilibrium.
11in   z exerts on unionized and non-unionized ﬁrms. From inspection of (12), we can conclude that a
higher competitive wage, while triggering higher union wage claims, reduces the union wage premium
ω. This fall in ω is instrumental for rendering ﬁrms more similar in both scale and scope. Formally,
this can be shown by looking at the two diﬀerentials ∆ ≡ δc − δu and Ξ ≡ Xc − Xu. Regarding
the scope diﬀerential, we can note from Eq. (10) that ∆ = ln(ω), which deﬁnitely falls when ω goes
down. Furthermore, we can express the scale diﬀerential as Ξ = (wc/2b)[ω(2ω − 1)ln(ω) − ω + 1].11
Hence, there are two counteracting eﬀects of deunionization on the ﬁrm scale diﬀerential. On the
one hand, by driving up the competitive wage, a decline in   z magniﬁes the output diﬀerential for a
given ω. To understand this eﬀect, it is useful to note that δc = ln(ω(2ω − 1)) and δu = ln(2ω − 1).
Hence, by holding ω constant, we hold ﬁrm scope in both unionized and non-unionized sectors
constant. However, from our discussion at the end of Subsection 2.2 we know that, for a given ﬁrm
scope, an increase in the wage rate unambiguously increases the output of all interior varieties, and,
by operating a larger product range, this eﬀect is more pronounced in non-unionized ﬁrms. On the
other hand, a decline in ω renders ﬁrms more similar in scope. This lowers the ﬁrm scale diﬀerential
ceteris paribus. In our model, it is this second eﬀect that dominates so that, similar to an otherwise
identical model with SPFs, a decline in union density makes non-unionized and unionized producers
more similar in ﬁrm scale.12
This completes our discussion of the benchmark model. In a next step, we analyze to what
extent our insights from above need to be modiﬁed when accounting for a more general setting with
partial diﬀerentiation of consumer goods and oligopolistic competition in the product market.
2.5 A sophisticated model of MPFs with partially diﬀerentiated goods
In this subsection, we extend the previous model to one with ρ > 0. Accounting for symmetry of
ﬁrms within industries and using (8) in (7) gives
eδ(z) =
a/w(z) − φ
1 + φδ(z) − φ
, (14)
where φ ≡ ρ(n+1)/[2(1−ρ)] is a measure of product market competition, which positively depends
on the number of competitors, n, and negatively depends on the degree of product diﬀerentiation,
as captured by the inverse of ρ. Eq. (14) establishes a negative relationship between wage rate w(z)
11Using (10) in (8), and substituting the resulting expression for X
c and X
u, respectively, gives Ξ =
[w
c/(2b)][(a/w
c)ln(ω) − ω + 1]. Then, using a/w
c = ω(2ω − 1), according to (12), we end up with the respective
expression for Ξ in the main text.
12Totally diﬀerentiating Ξ with respect to w
c and accounting for dω/dw
c = −(ω/w
c)[(2ω −1)/(4ω − 1)], according










12and ﬁrm scope δ(z).13 Together (8) and (14) determine ﬁrm scale X(z) as an implicit function of
w(z). As outlined at the end of Subsection 2.2, a sectoral wage increase exerts two opposing eﬀects
on ﬁrm scale. On the one hand, there is a positive scale eﬀect of an increase in w(z) for given ﬁrm
scope while, on the other hand, the shortening of the product range that is triggered by an increase
in w(z) lowers ﬁrm scale. As pointed out above, it is the second eﬀect that dominates in our setting
so that ﬁrm scale falls along with ﬁrm scope when the sectoral wage rate increases.14
These implications of higher wages for ﬁrm scale and scope are taken into account by labor
unions, which in the more sophisticated model variant with partially diﬀerentiated goods maximize











according to (9) and (14). Totally diﬀerentiating the latter with respect to wu and setting the
resulting expression equal to zero allows us to derive the union wage claim as an implicit function













Eqs. (14) and (16) establish a system of two equations, which together determine the equilibrium
levels of wu and δu (for a given wc). If ρ = 0, we have φ = 0 and (14) and (16) reduce to the
respective expressions in (10) and (12). As outlined in Subsection 2.4, ﬁrms behave as monopolists
in the production of all of their varieties, and the number of competitors turns out to be irrelevant
for union wage claims in this case. Things are diﬀerent if ρ > 0. While similar to the benchmark
model higher union wage claims reduce industry-wide labor demand, the respective employment
decline is less pronounced if ρ > 0. The reason is the following: By reducing output of a certain
variety, the ﬁrm reduces its negative demand externality on all other varieties produced in the
respective industry. This feedback eﬀect is the stronger, the more ﬁrms are active in the respective
industry, so that the number of competitors is a crucial determinant of the union wage claim if
ρ > 0. Furthermore, with the negative employment response to a given wage increase being less
pronounced, union wage claims must be higher than in the benchmark model.15







δ(z) [1 + φδ(z) − φ] + φ
eδ(z)[1 + φδ(z)]
< 0.






2b(1 − ρ)[1 + φδ(z)]
< 0.
15The mechanisms here diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those in a setting with SPFs. Since a cannibalization eﬀect does
not materialize if ﬁrms are conﬁned to produce just a single variety, the union wage claim is invariant to the number
of producers – provided that unions are organized at the sector level (see Bastos and Kreickemeier, 2009, and the
13With these insights regarding the role of ρ for union wage setting at hand, we are well equipped
to characterize the general equilibrium outcome in the more sophisticated model variant. For




















Together with Eqs. (8), (14) – separately for unionized and non-unionized industries – and (16) this
gives a system of six equations, which jointly determine the autarky level of the six endogenous
variables wc, wu, δc, δu, Xc and Xu.
We complete the discussion of the more sophisticated model variant by investigating to what
extent our insights from the comparative-static exercise on ﬁrm-level adjustments to changes in
labor market institutions need to be modiﬁed if one considers partial diﬀerentiation of consumer
goods. As in the benchmark model with ρ = 0, a decline in union density, i.e. a reduction in   z,
gives an employment stimulus in the newly deunionized industries and, hence, the competitive wage
must increase in order to restore the labor market equilibrium. This increase in the competitive
wage induces higher union wage claims, so that all ﬁrms, except for the newly deunionized ones,
experience a production cost increase if   z declines. As a consequence, ﬁrm scale and scope fall
in all sectors in which labor market institutions do not change. Since this reasoning applies for
any possible ρ, we can conclude that the comparative static eﬀects of deunionization on ﬁrm scale
and scope in the benchmark model are robust to changes in the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Unfortunately, with respect to the impact of deunionization on the scale and scope diﬀerentials
between unionized and non-unionized ﬁrms or the total number of product varieties we were not
able to show that the insights from the benchmark scenario survive in the more sophisticated model
when allowing for arbitrary levels of ρ. However, with all variables of interest being continuously
diﬀerentiable in ρ, we can at least conclude that the respective insights from Subsection 2.4 are
robust to small changes in ρ. Hence, the parsimonious framework in the previous subsection is a
suitable benchmark for our analysis as long as the degree of product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently
high. This completes our discussion of the closed economy.
3 MPFs and labor market imperfection in an open economy
It is the purpose of this section to shed light on ﬁrm level adjustments if the country under con-
sideration opens up to trade. Thereby, we consider trade between two fully symmetric economies
and abstract from the existence of any impediments of shipping goods across borders.16 Product
cited literature there).
16While the model allows in principle for considering such trade impediments, doing so would complicate the
analysis enormously. For instance, one could allow for iceberg transport costs. In this case, MPFs would choose
diﬀerent scale and scope for the domestic and the export market and, hence, we would end up with four scale and
scope variables instead of just two variables, as in the closed economy. Alternatively, one might assume that only
a subset of sectors has access to the export market (see, for instance, Epifani and Gancia, 2009; Kreickemeier and
14markets are segmented and labor is not allowed to move across borders. In the interest of read-
ability, we do not repeat all the steps of the formal analysis in Section 2, but instead stick to an
informal discussion of the trade eﬀects on ﬁrm scale and scope in the main text of our paper. A
characterization of the open economy equilibrium and formal details on the eﬀects of a country’s
movement from autarky to trade can be found in the appendix. Similar to the closed economy, we
start our analysis by ﬁrst looking at the benchmark model with ρ = 0 and brieﬂy discuss the more
sophisticated model with ρ > 0 afterwards.
If ρ = 0, opening up for trade does not change a ﬁrm’s competitive environment and leaves
the partial equilibrium outcome unaﬀected. However, there are general equilibrium eﬀects, because
ﬁrms start to serve foreign consumers in the open economy and thus expand production and labor
demand at the extensive margin. To restore the labor market equilibrium, the competitive wage
must increase and unions respond to this increase in wc by raising their wage claims. The surge
in factor costs causes a shortening of the product range of all competitors and ﬁrm scope falls in
unionized as well as non-unionized industries. With respect to ﬁrm scale, we can note that the
increase in factor costs lowers the output of ﬁrms for the domestic market. However, in the open
economy ﬁrms additionally serve foreign consumers and this expansion at the extensive margin
dominates the output reduction, so that ﬁrm scale unambiguously increases in all industries when
a country opens up for trade. This eﬀect is intuitive, as the decline in ﬁrm scope leaves more labor
for employment in the ﬁrms’ high-competence varieties which means that resources are used more
productively and ﬁrm scale can expand in the open economy. This outcome is in line with the key
ﬁnding of Eckel and Neary (2010) that ﬁrms become leaner and meaner when a country opens up
for trade, thereby generating productivity gains which refer to a new channel through which gains
from trade can materialize, a channel that is not present is textbook models of trade with SPFs.
In order to determine how trade aﬀects relative ﬁrm performance, it is worth noting that union
wage claims, while stimulated by the surge in the competitive wage, increase less than proportionally,
so that the union wage premium, ω, shrinks when the country opens up for trade with a symmetric
partner country. The fall in the wage diﬀerential reduces the cost disadvantage of unionized ﬁrms,
thereby lowering the diﬀerential in ﬁrm scope across industries, i.e. ∆ is lower in the open than
in the closed economy. The fall in the union wage premium is also instrumental for a decline of
the output diﬀerential in the domestic market. However, with market-speciﬁc output being larger
in non-unionized sectors, ﬁrms in these industries experience a more than proportional output
increase from exporting. It is this second eﬀect that dominates in our model, so that the ﬁrm scale
diﬀerential, Ξ, is magniﬁed in the open economy if ρ = 0.17
Meland, 2010). However, if a subset of both unionized and non-unionized industries is exposed to trade, we again end
up with four variables for ﬁrm scale and scope, similar to the case of iceberg transport costs. To present the main
insights of our analysis in the simplest possible way, we have decided to keep the number of scale and scope variables
small and thus abstract from any trade impediments.
17While the focus in this section is on ﬁrm-level variables, it is also possible to determine the impact of trade on the
total number of available product varieties. In this respect, we can distinguish two eﬀects. On the one hand, trade
lowers ﬁrm scope of all producers, which lowers the number of available product varieties ceteris paribus. On the
other hand, trade provides access to foreign product varieties, which raises the basket of available consumer goods.
With ρ = 0 it is the second eﬀect that dominates, so that in this case the number of available consumer goods
15While in the benchmark scenario with ρ = 0, trade does not change the competitive environment
of ﬁrms in the product market, but fosters competition for scarce labor and thus impacts the general
equilibrium outcome through adjustments in the competitive wage, there are pro-competitive eﬀects
at work if one allows for partial diﬀerentiation of consumer goods. In fact, these pro-competitive
eﬀects materialize along multiple lines. On the one hand, trade fosters product market competition
and thus reduces proﬁts ceteris paribus. While in a model with SPFs this does not exert a direct
eﬀect on union wage setting, it induces a fall in ﬁrm scope and thus gives room for higher union
wage claims in our setting. On the other hand, trade changes the labor market environment. While
sector-level unions unilaterally set industry-wide wage standards in the closed economy, they have
to account for the outcome of union wage setting in the foreign economy when the opening up for
trade exposes domestic producers to international competition. All other things equal, this gives
rise to a union-disciplining eﬀect and induces a fall in union wage claims. Hence, in the partial
equilibrium there are now two counteracting eﬀects of trade on union wage setting, while in the
general equilibrium there is an additional positive eﬀect due to a labor demand stimulus and a
higher competitive wage.
Clearly, for small levels of ρ, it is the general equilibrium eﬀect that dominates and thus union
wages unambiguously increase as in the benchmark model. Also our ﬁndings regarding the trade
eﬀects on ﬁrm size and scope as well as the diﬀerentials of these variables remain unaﬀected when ρ
increases from zero to a small positive level. However, things become more complicated if we allow
for high values of ρ and thus consider parameter conﬁgurations for which the partial equilibrium
eﬀects on union wage setting are strong. Since we are not able to derive sharp analytic results for
small degrees of product diﬀerentiation, we have conducted a series of numerical simulation exercises
in order to shed light on how our results from the benchmark model are aﬀected by an increase of
ρ from zero to a large positive value. Table 1 summarizes the main ﬁndings of these exercises for
a relatively small degree of product diﬀerentiation, ρ = 0.8.18 First of all, we can conclude from
the second column of the table that for high values of ρ union wage claims may actually fall in
response to trade liberalization. But this can only happen if the share of unionized industries is
suﬃciently small. An intuition for the role of   z in determining the impact of trade on union wage
claims can be found in Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009). As shown in their study on SPFs, a higher
  z, while not directly aﬀecting the strength of the (partial equilibrium) impact eﬀect on union wage
setting in a given industry, implies that this impact eﬀect is relevant for a larger share of sectors,
thereby reinforcing the labor demand stimulus of trade and thus the general equilibrium feedback
eﬀect through adjustments in wc. From this we can deduce that a positive eﬀect of trade on union
wage claims is the more likely, the larger is the share of unionized industries   z.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 present numerical results for the impact of trade on ﬁrm scope, and
these results indicate that all ﬁrms shorten their product range in response to trade, irrespective
unambiguously increases when the country opens up for trade.
18The program code for the simulation exercise (in Mathematica 8.0) and numerical results for other paramter


















  z = 0.1 -0.17 5.55 -0.02 -0.06 -0.61 -1.96 0.67 0.02
  z = 0.3 0.24 6.78 -0.03 -0.07 -0.73 -2.29 0.66 -0.16
  z = 0.5 0.90 8.50 -0.03 -0.08 -0.91 -2.72 0.61 -0.42
Notes: D denotes domestic ﬁrm-level output and subscripts a, t refer to autarky and trade
variables, respectively. Parameter values are a = 100, b = 1, ρ = 0.8, n = 5, L = 20.
Table 1: Trade Eﬀects on wages, scope and scale for diﬀerent values of trade union presence
of the prevailing labor market institutions. The negative eﬀect of trade on ﬁrm scope is more
pronounced in non-unionized industries, so that, in line with our benchmark model, ﬁrms become
more similar in this dimension. Furthermore, from inspection of columns 6 and 7, we can conclude
that the ﬁndings from our benchmark model regarding the impact of trade on domestic output
(D) also remain unaﬀected if one considers positive (and relatively high) values of ρ: All ﬁrms
reduce their domestic output level in response to trade. However, this does not mean that ﬁrm
scale falls as well, as ﬁrms get access to the export market and thus increase output at the extensive
margin. From columns 8 and 9 we see that, in contrast to the benchmark model, the expansion at
the extensive margin needs not be strong enough to dominate the output decline at the intensive
margin so that the total impact on ﬁrm scale is not clearcut in general if ρ is suﬃciently large.
To be more speciﬁc, the numerical results indicate that ﬁrm scale deﬁnitely increases in unionized
industries, while it may increase or fall in non-unionized sectors. In our simulation exercise, ﬁrm
scale increases in non-unionized industries if union density is low, while it declines if   z is suﬃciently
large.
To get an intuition for the role of   z in determining the impact of trade on ﬁrm scale, it is useful to
distinguish two eﬀects. On the one hand, trade induces a general decline in ﬁrm scope which leaves
more labor for producing high-competence varieties and thus stimulates ﬁrm scale in all industries.
On the other hand, the wage diﬀerential between unionized and non-unionized industries shrinks,
which implies that production shifts towards unionized sectors. The stronger the latter eﬀect is,
the more likely is a negative ﬁrm scale eﬀect of trade in non-unionized industries. From inspection
of columns 2 and 3 of Table 1, we can infer that the reduction in the wage diﬀerential is more
pronounced for high levels of union density. Hence, the second eﬀect dominates if   z is suﬃciently
large. Finally, for all parameter conﬁgurations in Table 1, the scale diﬀerential between unionized
and non-unionized industries shrinks in response to a country’s movement from autarky to trade,
which constitutes a further important diﬀerence to our benchmark model.
The above discussion highlights the role of labor market institutions for ﬁrm-level adjustments to
a country’s movement from autarky to trade. While in a setting with perfect labor markets MPFs
shorten their product range and increase the scale of output in response to trade, our analysis
makes clear that these ﬁrm-level eﬀects may change signiﬁcantly when labor market distortions are
17taken into account, with the degree of product diﬀerentiation being an important determinant of
how labor market institutions impact the adjustment of MPFs. Our ﬁndings therefore suggest that
shedding light on how product diﬀerentiation and labor market institutions interact is a prerequisite
for drawing a comprehensive picture of ﬁrm-level adjustments to international trade.
4 Concluding remarks
We have set up a general oligopolistic equilibrium model of MPFs and labor market imperfections
due to union wage-setting in a subset of industries. We have used this setting to tackle two questions
that have sparked considerable interest of economists in recent years and are of relevance for policy
makers alike. The ﬁrst question we are interested in deals with ﬁrm-level (and related economy-wide)
adjustments to declines in union density, a phenomenon that has been observed in all industrialized
countries over the last four decades. Associating a decline in union density with a reduction in the
share of unionized industries, we have shown that deunionization raises both the competitive and
the union wage and thus renders a shortening of the product range attractive for MPFs. In addition
to the decline in ﬁrm scope, the cost increase lowers total output of all interior varieties, so that
ﬁrm scale decreases in unionized as well as non-unionized industries. With ﬁrms concentrating on
high-competence varieties, deunionization therefore leads to an increase in labor productivity of all
ﬁrms (except for the newly deunionized ones). Aside from this productivity gain, consumers can
beneﬁt from an increase in the number of varieties if union density has already been low prior to
the deunionization process. This diﬀerentiates our setting from an otherwise identical model with
SPFs, where such productivity and variety eﬀects do not exist. The second question we tackle in
this paper is the impact of trade on ﬁrm scale and scope. In this respect, the main insight from
our analysis is that, while ﬁrms become leaner and meaner as in models of MPFs without labor
market frictions, the additional labor force that has been set free by the decline in ﬁrm scope is not
equally allocated to unionized and non-unionized industries and thus it is not guaranteed that all
ﬁrms actually increase their scale when being exposed to international trade. To be more speciﬁc,
with labor market institutions being industry-speciﬁc, the ﬁrm-level eﬀects of trade depend on a
non-trivial interplay of product diﬀerentiation and union density.
While we hope that our analysis contributes to a better understanding of how MPFs adjust their
scale and scope in response to macroeconomic shocks, it is clear that, in the interest of analytical
tractability we had to impose several simplifying assumptions which limit the practical relevance
of our results. Most notable in this respect is the assumption of an exogenous and equal number
of competitors within each industry. This assumption closes one important adjustment margin
and restricts our analysis to a short-run perspective. In the long run, it is plausible that ﬁrm
owners de-invest their capital stock and search for the best investment opportunities in the whole
economy. If there are no extra costs of moving capital across sectors, ﬁrm owners will adjust their
investment strategy in the long run until the return to their investment is the same in all industries.
In comparison to our short-run model with an exogenous and equal number of competitors in all
18industries, this induces a movement of producers towards non-unionized industries. Since non-
unionized ﬁrms are larger than unionized ones, this gives a labor demand stimulus, thereby raising
the competitive as well as the union wage. Hence, compared to our short-run model ﬁrm scale and
scope shrink in both unionized and non-unionized industries if capital is mobile across industries
(at least as long as products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated).
A further extension of our model which is worthwhile to consider is one that allows for analyzing
the consequences of marginal trade liberalization. Since the introduction of trade impediments
would signiﬁcantly complicate our analysis, such a modiﬁcation is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, we can follow Eckel and Neary (2010) and associate marginal steps of trade liberalization
with an increase in the number of trading partners. In the case of perfect product diﬀerentiation,
opening up for trade with an additional (symmetric) partner country reinforces the respective eﬀects
identiﬁed in the previous section. While this result can be extended to suﬃciently high degrees of
(partial) product diﬀerentiation, determining the respective eﬀects for arbitrary levels of ρ is not a
trivial task and, hence, we leave a more detailed discussion of this issue open for future research.
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20Appendix
Deunionization and the number of product varieties in the benchmark scenario
The total number of product varieties is given by N ≡ ˜ zNu + (1 − ˜ z)Nc = ˜ znδu + (1 − ˜ z)nδc.























according to (10). Totally diﬀerentiating (13) and accounting for a/wu = 2ω −1, a/wc = ω(2ω −1)
from (12), we can calculate
dwc
d˜ z
= wc 4ω(ω − 1)2 − [ω(2ω − 1) − 1]2
8˜ zω3(4ω − 1)−1(ω − 1) + (1 − ˜ z)[(ω(2ω − 1))2 − 1]
. (18)
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which is positive for any ω > 1. This proves the respective statement in the main text. QED
Deunionization in a sophisticated model with ρ > 0
In a ﬁrst step, we show that dwu/dwc > 0 still holds in the more general setting with ρ > 0. For
this purpose, we can deﬁne the implicit function












according to (16). Partially diﬀerentiating Γ(·) with respect to wc and accounting for a/wu =
eδu




+ 1)(1 + φδu) − 2φ(eδu
− 1)
2(1 + φδu)(eδu − 1)
, (23)
21which is positive.19 Partially diﬀerentiating Γ(·) with respect to wu gives
∂Γ(·)



































from FN 13 and substituting a/wu = eδu

















(eδu − 1)(1 + φδu)
, β ≡
eδu







Hence, α > 1, which is equivalent to 1 − φ(eδu
− δu − 1) > 0, is suﬃcient for ∂Γ(·)/∂wu < 0. Using
(14) together with (16), we can conclude that 1 − φ(eδu
− δu − 1) > 0 is equivalent to ω > 1, so
that ∂Γ(·)/∂wu < 0 and, by applying the implicit function theorem to (22), also dwu/dwc > 0 are
immediate.








(eδ(z) + 1)(1 + φδ(z)) − 2φ(eδ(z) − 1)
 
, (28)
which is negative (see (23) and FN 19). On the one hand, this implies wu(eδu
−1)2 < wc(eδc
−1)2,
so that the right-hand side of (13′) unambiguously falls in ˜ z, when holding wages constant. On the
other hand, combining df(z)/dw(z) < 0 with dwu/dwc > 0, we can conclude that the right-hand side
of (13′) determines a negative relationship between economy-wide labor demand and the competitive
wage wc. Putting together, we get dwc/d˜ z < 0, dwu/d˜ z < 0, which in view of dδ(z)/dw(z) < 0 (see
above), implies dδc/d˜ z > 0, dδu/d˜ z > 0. Finally, accounting for dX(z)/dw(z) < 0 (see FN 14), we
also get dXc/d˜ z > 0 and dXu/d˜ z > 0. This completes the proof. QED
Characterization of the open economy equilibrium: the case of ρ = 0
Since with ρ = 0 there is no competition in the product market, the relationship between w(z)
and δ(z) in the open economy, remains to be given by the respective autarky relationship in (10).
Similarly, union wage setting is not aﬀected either and remains to be given by (12) in the open
19It is immediate that the denominator of this expression is positive, while the numerator is strictly increasing in
δ
u and equals 2 at δ
u = 0.
22economy. However, trade raises competition for scarce labor and thus impacts the labor market
















instead of (13), where ˆ n ≡ 2n. Finally, with ﬁrms serving two instead of just a single market total
ﬁrm output is now given by X(z) = 2D(z), where D(z) equals local output in (8), when setting
ρ = 0.
Trade eﬀects in the benchmark model with ρ = 0
Comparing the open economy equilibrium in the last subsection with the respective equilibrium
under autarky, we see that trade provides a labor demand stimulus and thus raises the competitive
wage. Hence, in view of (10) and (12), it is immediate that wu is larger, while δc, δu are smaller
in the open than in the closed economy. Furthermore, noting from Subsection 2.4 that an increase
in wc lowers ω, it is also immediate that the scope diﬀerential ∆ = δc − δu = ln(ω) falls when a
country opens up for free trade. To determine the scale eﬀects, we can combine (8) and (10), in




































for a ﬁrm’s domestic output in the open economy (see above). Recollecting from the analysis in
Subsection 2.4 that the right hand-side of (30) is strictly decreasing in w(z) and noting from above
that a movement from autarky to free trade raises both the competitive and the union wage, it is
immediate that D(z) < Xa(z).
To determine the impact of trade on total ﬁrm scale X(z), we can make use of the following fact:
The impact of trade on X(z) is qualitatively the same as the impact of trade on Y (z) ≡ ˆ nX(z),
where ˆ n = n under autarky and ˆ n = 2n under free trade. Put diﬀerently, we can infer the impact
of a country’s opening up for free trade on ﬁrm scale from diﬀerentiating Y (z) with respect to ˆ n.




























Distinguishing between non-unionized and unionized industries, accounting for a/wc = ω(2ω − 1)
23and a/wu = 2ω − 1, according to (12), and using dwc/dˆ n = (wc/ˆ n) × γ(ω)/ζ(ω), with
γ(ω) ≡ 4˜ zω(ω − 1)2 + (1 − ˜ z)
 
ω(2ω − 1) − 1
 2
, (33)
ζ(ω) ≡ 4˜ zω(ω − 1)2 2ω2
4ω2 − 5ω + 1
+ (1 − ˜ z)
 
ω(2ω − 1) − 1
 2  
ω(2ω − 1) + 1
ω(2ω − 1) − 1
 
, (34)











































respectively. It is tedious but straightforward to show that the right-hand sides of (35) and (36) are
positive, implying that dY c/dn > 0, dY u/dn > 0.20 This implies that a movement from autarky to
trade raises ﬁrm scale in unionized as well as non-unionized industries.
In a ﬁnal step, we look at the impact of trade on ﬁrm size diﬀerential Ξ. Noting that, with
a constant number of competitors in either country, changes in Ξ are qualitatively the same as







ω(2ω − 1)ln(ω) − (ω − 1) −
(ω − 1)
 







It is tedious but straightforward to show that the sign of the latter is positive, implying that the
ﬁrm size diﬀerential increases when a country moves from autarky to free trade. This completes
the proof. QED
Characterization of the open economy equilibrium: the case of ρ > 0
In this subsection, we summarize the six equation that characterize the open economy equilibrium
in the sophisticated model variant with ρ > 0.21 In this case, ﬁrm scale and scope in non-unionized


















a/wc − φ(2n + 1)/(n + 1)
1 + φ(δc − 1)(2n + 1)/(n + 1)
 
, δu = ln
 
a/wu − φ(2n + 1)/(n + 1)
1 + φ(δu − 1)(2n + 1)/(n + 1)
 
, (39)
20Further details of the proof have been deferred to a technical supplement, which is available upon request.
21We do not present derivation details here, as the respective calculations are tedious. Instead, we refer the interested
reader to a technical supplement, which is available upon request.

















(1 + φδu − φ) + φ
 
− φ2δu [n/(n + 1)]
2  
eδu
(δu − 1) + 1
 





















(not intended for publication)
The impact of trade on total ﬁrm output
The ﬁst part of the supplement aims at providing further derivation details for the impact of an
increase in ˆ n on Y c, Y u, and Ψ. Let us ﬁrst consider Y c. From (35), we can conclude that








ζ(ω) > [ω(2ω − 1) − 1]γ(ω), (S1)
where ζ(ω), γ(ω) are given by (33) and (34), respectively. Using straightforward calculations, we
can conclude that dY c/dˆ n > 0 if T1 + T2 > 0, with
T1 ≡ −
4  zω(2ω − 1)(ω − 1)2












(1 −   z)[ω(2ω − 1) − 1]
2
















ω(2ω − 1) − 1
 2 
.
The positive sign of dY c/dˆ n > 0 can then be inferred from T1 > 0 and T2 > 0.22













Equivalently, we can state that dY u/dˆ n > 0 holds if T3 + T4 > 0, with
T3 ≡ [(2ω − 1)[ln(2ω − 1) − 1] + 1]
ω
ω − 1
− 2(ω − 1),
T4 ≡ [(2ω − 1)[ln(2ω − 1) − 1] + 1]
ω(2ω − 1) + 1





It can be shown that, for any ω > 1, T3 > 0,T4 > 0, so that dY u/dˆ n > 0 is immediate.
In a ﬁnal step, we now look at the impact of an increase in ˆ n on Ψ. From (37) it follows that
dΨ/dˆ n > 0 if
ω(2ω − 1)ln(ω) − (ω − 1) >
(ω − 1)
 

















ω(2ω − 1) + 1
ω(2ω − 1) − 1
−
2ω2
4ω2 − 5ω + 1
 
= 1, (S4)
22While we have shown the positive signs of T1,T2 analytically, the respective signs can also be veriﬁed with any









4ω2 − 5ω + 1
2ω2 , (S5)
we can further conclude that
2ω2 
ω(2ω − 1)ln(ω) − (ω − 1)
 
> (ω − 1)2  
4ω2 + 2ω − 1
 
(S6)
is suﬃcient for dΨ/dˆ n > 0. This completes the respective proof. QED
Characterization of the open economy equilibrium: the case of ρ > 0







(ln(w(z)) − 1) + 1
 
. (S7)
Accounting for symmetry and recollecting that we abstract from any trade impediments, ﬁrm scale
X(z) equals 2D(z). This establishes the respective scale expressions in (38). Furthermore, with




[eδ∗(z)(δ∗(z) − 1) + 1], (S8)
X∗(z) = 2D∗(z), respectively, where an asterisk denotes foreign variables. Total sector output in
the open economy is then given by Y (z) = nD(z) + nD∗(z). Substituting the latter together with




a − w(z)φ − w∗(z)φ[n/(n + 1)][eδ∗(z)(δ∗(z) − 1) + 1]





a − w∗(z)φ − w(z)φ[n/(n + 1)][eδ(z)(δ(z) − 1) + 1]
1 + φδ∗(z) − φ
(S10)
for domestic and foreign ﬁrms’ scope, respectively. In the case of symmetry, with δu = δu∗ and
wu = wu∗, Eq. (S9) can be simpliﬁed to (39).
Proceeding as in the closed economy, we can now determine the union objective in Home, which






























(1 + φδu − φ) + φ
 
(1 + φδu∗) − φ2[n/(n + 1)]2 
eδu





(1 + φδu)(1 + φδu∗) − φ2δuδu∗[n/(n + 1)]2
  .







(1 + φδu − φ) + φ
 
(1 + φδu) − φ2[n/(n + 1)]2 
eδu





(1 + φδu)2 − (φδu)
2 [n/(n + 1)]2
  . (S13)
Substituting (S13) into (S12), we obtain after tedious but straightforward calculations:
wu = wc(1/2)
 
1 − eδu 
+ H(δu)
1 − eδu + H(δu)
, (S14)
where H(δu) is deﬁned in analogy to the appendix. Eq. (S14) can be easily transformed into Eq.
(40).
Finally, combining Eqs. (13), (13′), and (29), we can write the full employment condition as
in (41). Putting all elements together, we therefore arrive at the open economy equilibrium as
characterized by (38)-(41). This completes the proof. QED
III